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COMMENT
The Best Interests of the Child-Custody and
Visitation in Pennsylvania
INTRODUCTION
In any case involving visitation or child custody, the paramount
concern must be the welfare and best interests of the child.'. The
common law rule, which was encoded in the statute in 1895,2 remains
the criterion for the courts to follow.3 Although parents have a prima
facie right to the custody of their children, the existence of convincing
reasons can result in a natural parent being deprived of custody if
the best interests of the child so require. 4 In a custody dispute
between the natural parerits, the parents are on equal ground with
regard to the burdens of proof,5 and the court must look to other
factors to determine custody rights. This comment will serve to give
a general overview of the current Pennsylvania law with regard to
such factors as the 'tender years' doctrine, child's preference, parental
fitness, and other considerations weighed by the courts in determining
what will serve the best interests of the child. This comment will
1. Spells v. Spells, 250 Pa. Super. 168, 378 A.2d 879, 882 (1977)(stepparent
may not be denied visitation rights solely on the basis of lack of blood relationship).
2. Act of June 26, 1895, P.L. 316, §2, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, §92
(Purdon 1965) states:
In all cases of dispute between the father and mother of such minor child, as
to which parent shall be entitled to its custody or services, the judges of the
courts shall decide, in their sound discretion, as to which parent, if either,
the custody of such minor child shall be committed, and shall remand such
child accordingly, regard first being had to the fitness of such parent and the
best interest and permanent welfare of said child.
3. Commonwealth ex rel. Schofield v. Schofield, 173 Pa. Super. 631, 98
A.2d 437 (1953)(in habeas corpus proceedings to obtain custody of children, the
criterion to determine award of custody is the welfare and best interest of the child
to which all other interests are subordinated).
4. Commonwealth ex rel. Patricia L.F. v. Malbert J.F., Jr., 278 Pa. Super.
343, 420 A.2d 572 (1980)(convincing reasons must be shown for child to be awarded
to third party).
5. Porch v. Porch, 327 Pa. Super. 346, 475 A.2d 831, 832 (1984).
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also look at the rights of third parties in matters of both custody
and visitation. In conclusion, the growing trend toward 'joint' or
'shared' custody will be discussed. Throughout this work it will be
evident that the primary concern of the courts is what is in the best
interest and welfare of the child.
I. Factors
Although the statute and the common law rule directed courts to
grant custody on the basis of the best interests of the child, one
factor in determining the best interests became so strong it soon
ranged between a presumption and a prima facie right. The 'tender
years' doctrine was often explained in language similar to the follow-
ing:
Unless compelling reasons appear to the contrary a child of tender
years should be committed to the care and custody of its mother, by
whom the needs of the child are ordinarily best served. A mother is
best qualified to have the custody of a child of tender years because
nothing can take the place of a real mother's love. 6
This created the situation whereby, all things being equal as to the
fitness of the parents, the 'tender years' doctrine would result in the
mother being granted custody of the child in the absence of com-
pelling reasons to the contrary.
7
In 1977 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Commonwealth
ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson8 wherein Justice Nix, writing for the court,
took the view that the 'tender years' doctrine created a gender based
presumption which was offensive to article I, § 28 of the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution, 9 the state's equal rights amendment. 10 Justice Nix
further warned that courts should not decide sensitive matters on the
basis of an invocation of "presumptions."" The superior court
6. Commonwealth ex rel. O'Hey v. McCurdy, 196 Pa.Super. 79, 173 A.2d
672, 674 (1961). See also Commonwealth ex rel. Logue v. Logue, 194 Pa. Super.
210, 166 A.2d 60 (1960)(one of the strongest presumptions in our law is that a
mother has a prima facie right to her children over any other person).
7. Commonwealth ex rel. Maines v. McCandless, 175 Pa. Super. 157, 103
A.2d 480, 483 (1954).
8. 470 Pa. 290, 368 .A.2d 635 (1977).
9. PA. CONST. art. I, §28 states: Prohibition Against Denial or Abridge-
ment of Equality of Rights Because of Sex. Equality or rights under the law shall
not be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the
sex of the individual.
10. 470 Pa. at 299-300, 368 A.2d at 639-40.
11. 470 Pa. at 300, 368 A.2d at 640.
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heeded the warning when it reversed and remanded a lower court
decision to award custody to the mother since the trial judge felt the
"best interest of the child, and that is the only guiding light that I
should use, is with the mother. 11 2 The superior court noted that it
was evident that the trial court had "impermissively awarded cus-
tody" to the mother by applying the "discredited and rejected 'tender
years' doctrine. 1' 3 In view of the record which indicated that the
child had been in a "happy, healthy environment" while living with
the father, and the environment with the mother being of "untested
value", the superior court remanded with instructions to the trial
court to award custody to the father.1 4
Before its demise in Spriggs, the 'tender years' doctrine had come
under some criticism. In 1972, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
referred to the doctrine as merely a vehicle through which a decision
respecting the child's custodial well being is reached."5 As early as
1954, the superior court noted that a mother's right to the care and
custody of her child was not absolute, it must yield to the best
interest and welfare of the child.' 6 The courts in Spriggs and cases
following recognized that the age of the child is still a factor to be
considered in awarding custody. What the courts have eliminated is
the instance where, all things being equal as to the fitness of both
parents, custody is awarded solely on the basis of a gender-biased
presumption. 17
Another factor courts consider in determining the best interests
and welfare of the child is the child's preference. Generally, if the
child is of sufficient intelligence, its preferences should be consid-
ered.' 8 However, the preference must be based on a good reason.' 9
12. Miller v. Miller, 327 Pa. Super. 45, 474 A.2d 1165, 1166 (1984). See also
Commonwealth ex rel. Weber v. Weber, 272 Pa. Super. 88, 414 A.2d 682 (1979)(tender
years presumption rejected as law of Pennsylvania).
13. 327 Pa. Super. at 48, 474 A.2d at 1166.
14. 327 Pa. Super. at 50-51, 474 A.2d at 1168.
15. Commonwealth ex rel. Parikh v. Parikh, 449 Pa. 105, 296 A.2d 625
(1972).
16. Commonwealth ex rel. Hubbell v. Hubbell, 176 Pa. Super. 186, 107 A.2d
388 (1954).
17. Spriggs, 470 Pa. at 299-300, 368 A.2d at 639-40.
18. Commonwealth ex rel. Sablosky v. Sablosky, 178 Pa. Super. 428, 115
A.2d 753 (1955)(when determining custody court must look to welfare of minor
children, not who is responsible for failure of marriage).
19. Commonwealth ex rel. Lees v. Lees, 196 Pa. Super. 32, 173 A.2d 691
(1961)(custody awarded to father when minor child had resided with uncle for only
a few weeks).
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For example, in Commonwealth ex rel. Husak v. Husak,20 the
superior court upheld the trial court's award of custody to the
stepmother of two teenage boys who indicated they enjoyed more
peace of mind with her than with their overly-authoritarian father.2 1
The court stated that the record evidenced the fear the boys held for
their father, as well as his lack of concern for their needs, clearly
indicating that the interests of the boys would be best served by
granting custody to the stepmother. 22
Because the best interests of the child not only include their physical
well being, "but also their intellectual, spiritual and moral well
being," 23 courts will recognize a child's preference if it is based on
such factors as "unadjustable incompatibility",24 length of residence
in home preferred, 25 maturity of the child,26 and a stated preference
for schooling.2 7 On the other hand, a child's preference will not be
given weight if the child is of younger years,28 or if preference is
based upon such matters as a gift of a pony29 or a dogA0 Nor is the
preference to be given controlling weight. In Grieb v. Driban,31 the
superior court reversed and remanded a trial court's decision to grant
custody to the mother based solely on the expressed preference of
the sixteen year old son. 3 2 On remand, the trial court was to hold a
full hearing in order to determine the reasons behind the stated
preference since "a mere statement of preference is of little persuasive
value." 3 3
20. 273 Pa. Super. 192, 417 A.2d 233 (1979).
21. 273 Pa. Super. at 197-98, 417 A.2d at 236.
22. Id.
23. 273 Pa. Super. at 196, 417 A.2d at 235.
24. Barton v. Barton, 40 Cal. Rptr. 676, 230 Cal. App.2d 43 (1964)(mother
habitually dwelt on marital difficulties, denounced father to daughter, and listened
to daughter's telephone calls with friends).
25. Lees, 196 Pa. Super. at 37, 173 A.2d at 694.
26. Husak, 273 Pa. Super. at 196-98, 417 A.2d at 235-36. (Boys aged 16 and
14 of sufficient maturity).
27. Commonwealth ex rel. Gregory v. Gregory, 188 Pa. Super. 350, 146 A.2d
624 (1958)(mother granted custody of two sons for nine months of year to enable
them to attend Pennsylvania schools).
28. In re Custody of Myers, 242 Pa. Super. 225, 363 A.2d 1242 (1976)(five
and one-half year old child's preference not weighed heavily).
29. Ellingsen v. Magsamen, 337 Pa. Super. 14, 486 A.2d 456 (1984)(preference
for father based on larger yard and pony not considered).
30. McCourt v. Meyers, 268 Pa. Super. 152, 407 A.2d 879 (1979).
31. 312 Pa. Super. 371, 458 A.2d 1006 (1983).
32. 312 Pa. Super. at 374, 458 A.2d at 1007.
33. Id. (citing Martincheck v. Martincheck, 262 Pa. Super. 346, 350, 396
A.2d 788, 790 (1979)).
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Although a child's preference may not be controlling, the court in
Tobias v. Tobias34 noted that a child's statements may not be
significant because of "their accuracy but [may be significant] in
how they reveal the psychological impact of the [parent's] behavior
on the child.' '3-
The question can be raised as to why no controlling weight is
given to a child's preference in awarding custody in view of the fact
the preference may effect the child's ability to adapt. Two reasons
can be noted from court decisions. First, if the child gains the
impression that he or she can influence a change of custody at will,
the child may be able to hold such a threat over the custodial parent
resulting in the tragic loss of ability to control or supervise the child.
36
Second, preference may be based on the fact that the preferred parent
influenced the child or offered the child a gift.37 Therefore, Penn-
sylvania courts require something more than an unsubstantiated
preference.
38
The fitness of the parents is given significant weight in determining
who should be awarded custody of the child. As a general rule, the
natural parents have a prima facie right to the custody of their
children which can be forfeited only if convincing reasons indicate
that the child's best interests will be served by removing him from
the parent's custody.39 The right of custody, therefore, is not absolute
but can be forfeited by misconduct or actions which substantially
affect the welfare of the child. 40 It must be noted, however, that it
is the present ability of the parent to care for the child which is at
issue at the time of the custody hearing.41 Consequently, a parent's
unsettled past does not preclude custody unless his past behavior has
a continuous negative effect on the child's welfare. 42
34. 248 Pa. Super. 168, 374 A.2d 1372 (1977).
35. 248 Pa. Super. at 173-74, 374 A.2d at 1375.
36. See Commonwealth ex rel. Beil v. Fisler, 58 Dauph. 174 (1947) (child's
testimony must be carefully and criticially analyzed).
37. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
38. 312 Pa. Super. at 373-74, 458 A.2d at 1007.
39. In re Donna W., 284 Pa. Super. 338, 425 A.2d 1132 (1981) aff'd &
rem'd, after new trial denying return of child to mother, 325 Pa. Super. 39, 472
A.2d 635 (1984).
40. Commonwealth ex rel. Murphy v. Walters, 258 Pa. Super. 418, 392 A.2d
863 (1978) (aunt obtained custody of two nephews on basis of evidence that mother
often left children unbathed, and that trailer in which the children resided was filthy
with dog excrement).
41. In re Custody of Frank, 283 Pa. Super. 229, 423 A.2d 1229 (1980).
42. Hartman v. Hartman, 328 Pa. Super. 154, 476 A.2d 938 (1984).
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For example, in In re Snellgrose,43 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
noted that while past moral lapses are insufficient to deprive a mother
of the child's custody, "persistent and flagrant" acts are impossible
to disregard since they cast serious doubts on her concept of moral
standards. 44 Consequently, the court granted custody to a third party
couple who had had the child in their home for several years. 45
With regard to fitness, the superior court has noted that even
though there is a finding that both parents are equally fit to care
for the child, it does not necessarily follow that the best interest of
the child will be served by either parent.46 In such instances, the
factor of stability can be decisive, especially when the stability has
resulted from the continued residence with one parent and the cre-
ation of bonds of affection.47 The' courts have reasoned that to break
such bonds "may result not only in the child's unhappiness, but also
in its physical injury." 48 Thus, the superior court held in Gonzalez
v. Gonzalez49 that where both parents are equally fit, positive weight
must be given to the primary caretaker.
50
"Compelling reasons" must be given to separate siblings and divide
children between their parents.-" If a court intends to issue a split
custody order, it must first look at the relationship between the
children and the benefits flowing from that relationship.5 2 However,
the interest in raising children together is not inflexible and must
yield to what is in the best interest of the children.5 3 Therefore, an
43. 432 Pa. 158, 247 A.2d 596 (1968) (mother had had several illicit affairs,
one of which daughter was an offspring of, and was currently having a relationship
with a married man).
44. 432 Pa. at 164-65, 247 A.2d at 600.
45. 423 Pa. at 168, 247 A.2d at 601.
46. 249 Pa. Super. 82, 369 A.2d 821 (1977) (father who had remarried could
provide a family unit for children and thereby provide greater stability).
47. 246 Pa. Super. at 88-89, 369 A.2d at 824.
48. Id. See also Commonwealth ex rel. Kraus v. Kraus, 185 Pa. Super. 167,
138 A.2d 225 (1958) (emotional disturbance to child being removed from familiar
surroundings could have harmful effect on child's well being).
49. 337 Pa. Super. 1, 486 A.2d 449 (1984) (party seeking to modify existing
custody agreement must prove substantial change in circumstances to warrant a
change).
50. 337 Pa. Super. at 8, 486 A.2d at 453.
51. Pilon v. Pilon, 342 Pa. Super. 52, 492 A.2d 59 (1985) (trial court abused
discretion by dividing children between parents in absence of compelling reasons).
52. Ferencak v. Moore, 300 Pa. Super. 28, 445 A.2d 1282 (1982) (trial court's
award splitting custody of children between mother and grandparents did not consider-
impact on sibling relationship).
53. In Interest of Tremayne Quame Idress R., 286 Pa. Super. 480, 497-98,
429 A.2d 40, 49 (1981) (trial court not obliged to leave two year old child with
grandmother in order for child to be raised with half sister).
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award of custody of the seven year old son to the father was totally
justified where the son was experiencing emotional problems over
the parents separation and the mother's intended move to Atlanta
would have uprooted him from his relatives, even though the mother
was awarded custody of the thirteen year old daughter.
54
The above named factors are generally the major ones evaluated
by the courts in determining who shall be awarded custody of the
minor child or children. Fundamental to all the judicial consideration
required to make this very sensitive decision is the inflexible policy5
of what is in the best interest of the child.
II. THmn PAR=IS
With the rejection of the 'tender years' doctrine, both parents are
generally on equal footing as to the burden of proving that the
welfare and best interest of the child lies with awarding custody to
him or her. 56 The exception to this is when a parent petitions to
change an existing order, in which case the petitioner must show a
substantial change in circumstances in order for the court to alter
the award of custody.5 7 Such is not the case, however, when the
dispute over custody is between a natural parent and a third party.
Since the natural parents have a prima facie right to custody which
can be forfeited only for convincing reasons, even prior to the custody
proceedings the scales are tipped toward the parent.5 8 Consequently,
the nonparent bears the burdens of production and persuasion. 9
54. Commonwealth ex rel. Berman v. Berman, 289 Pa. Super. 91, 432 A.2d
1066 (1981). In addition to the seven year old, two other children ages seventeen
and eighteen had chosen to remain with the father. Thus, award of custody of
seven year old to the mother would still not have preserved a family unit. 289 Pa.
Super. at 95-101, 432 A.2d at 1068-71 (Hester, J., concurring).
55. 286 Pa. Super. at 497, 429 A.2d at 49.
56. Ellerbe v. Hooks, 490 Pa. 363, 416 A.2d 512 (1980).
57. See Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 337 Pa. Super. 1, 486 A.2d 449 (1984); Daniel
K.D. v. Jan M.H., 301 Pa. Super. 36, 446 A.2d 1323 (1982); and Hartman v.
Hartman, 328 Pa. Super. 154, 476 A.2d 938 (1984).
58. Ellerbe v. HQoks, 490 Pa. 363, 416 A.2d 512 (1980) citing J. Spaeth in
In re Hernandez, 249 Pa. Super. 274, 286, 376 A.2d 648, 654 (1977).
59. 490 Pa. at 368, 416 A.2d at 514. The court, through Justice Roberts
stated:
Our determination today is only an appropriate recognition that the blood
relationship of parenthood has traditionally served and continues to serve as
our society's fundamental criterion for allocating control over and responsi-
bility for our children, and that without some showing of harm, the courts
should not interfere with that arrangement.
490 Pa. at 369, 416 A.2d at 514-15.
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In Ellerbe v. Hooks,60 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court enunciated
the parental prima facie right to custody of the child, thus creating
the presumption in favor of the natural parent. 61 Both Justice Flaherty
and Justice Nix, while concurring in the result of the case, disagreed
with the need to create another presumption. 62 The application of
the presumption would only cloud the real concern of the case which
is what will serve the best interests of the child.6 Thus, the two
Justices reasoned, judges should weigh "'parenthood as a strong
factor for consideration" in custody proceedings and avoid deciding
sensitive matters on the basis of presumptions.64
The problem is that, although the presumption is rebuttable, there
must first be a threshold finding of compelling or convincing circum-
stances.65 Accordingly, before a stepparent or third party can be
awarded custody, this individual must show that the circumstances
of the case justify the court in acting for the welfare of the child by
granting custody to the nonparent. 66 Examples of the threshold
60. 490 Pa. 363, 416 A.2d 512 (1980) (parents have prima facie right to
custody of children which can only be forfeited if convincing reasons indicate the
best interest of child would be served by awarding custody to someone else).
61. Id.
62. 490 Pa. at 371-74, 416 A.2d at 515-17. The 'other' presumption being
the 'tender years' doctrine rejected three years earlier in Commonwealth ex rel.
Spriggs v. Carson, 470 Pa. 290, 368 A.2d 635 (1977).
63. 490 Pa. at 374, 416 A.2d at 517.
64. Id. (Italics in original.)
65. See generally In re Custody of Myers, 242 Pa. Super. 225, 363 A.2d
1242 (1976) (no compelling reason evidenced in record to deprive mother of custody
of child) and In re Custody of Hernandez, 249 Pa. Super. 274, 376 A.2d 648 (1977)
(no convincing reasons appeared which would indicate prima facie right to child
had been forfeited).
66. In re Custody of Hernandez, 249 Pa. Super. 274, 376 A.2d 648 (1977).
Judge Spaeth noted that cases involving child custody disputes can fall within
three categories: parent v. parent, parent v. state, and parent v. nonparent. The
first, parent v. parent is controlled by Act of June 26, 1895, P.L. 316, § 2, 48 P.S.
§ 92. The second category, parent v. state, is controlled by the Juvenile Act or Act
of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1464, No. 333, 11 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 50-101 et seq.
(Supp. 1976) [now 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6301 et seq. (Purdon 1982)].
The third category, parent v. nonparent, is not covered by statute but:
[i]t rather is a case that involves one party (the parent) who because of inherent
characteristics has a special interest in the child's welfare, and another party,
not like the state, a total stranger to the child, nor like the parent, inherently
related to the child, but, nevertheless, one who has by reason of having cared
for the child developed a special relationship with the child.
249 Pa. Super. at 278-82, 376 A.2d at 650-52.
In what appeared to be an argument of semantics but was actually thoughtful
delineation, Judge Spaeth reasoned that the nonparent must produce convincing
reasons that custody should be awarded to him. He considered that 'compelling'
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question may be the evidence of the unfitness of the natural parent6 7
or proof that the parent had abandoned his right to the child.68
Justice Nix's majority opinion in Albright v. Commonwealth ex
rel. Fetters,69 was directed precisely at the "full effect of the result
of the parent's prima facie right to custody."' 70 The prima facie right,
he explained, is "nothing more than a procedural device which assigns
the burden of proceeding with the evidence. A fact presumed to be
true unless disproved by some evidence to the contrary.''71 In other
words, maintenance of the parental relationship is important, how-
ever, it will not preclude an award of custody to a nonparent where
the best interests and welfare of the child are served by such a
determination. 72
It may appear that the difference between the presumption ap-
proach and the weighted factor approach are next to non-existent,
but the results in individual cases may be contrary. For example, in
Wrecsis v. Broughton73 the superior court affirmed an award of
custody of a thirteen year old girl to her maternal grandparents, with
whom she had lived for eleven years, without a showing that the
mother and stepfather were unfit.7 4 Conversely, the Supreme Court
would appear too synonymous with the 'clear necessity' requirement of the Juvenile
Act which is the state's burden. On the other hand, to permit a 'preponderance of
the evidence' standard would place the nonparent on the same level as the parent.
"The requirement of 'convincing' . . . reasons makes it clear that the third party's
burden is in weight midway between the state's burden" and one parent's burden
against the other parent. 249 Pa. Super. at 286-87, 376 A.2d at 654.
The appropriate language of the Juvenile Act referred to above states:
(3) To achieve the foregoing purposes in a family environment whenever
possible, separating the child from parents only when necessary for his welfare or
in the interests of public safety. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6301(b)(3).
67. See Commonwealth ex rel. Murphy v. Walters, 258 Pa. Super. 418, 392
A.2d 863 (1978) supra note 40, and In re Snellgrose, 432 Pa. 158, 247 A.2d 596
(1968) (mother left daughter with third party couple sporadically for up to two
years at a time).
68. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2511 states:
(a) General rule.-The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be
terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months
either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a
child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.
69. 491 Pa. 320, 421 A.2d 157-(1980).
70. 491 Pa. at 323, 421 A.2d at 158.
71. 491 Pa. at 325-26, 421 A.2d at 159 note 1.
72. 491 Pa. at 326, 421 A.2d at 160.
73. Wrecsis v. Broughton, 285 Pa. Super. 90, 426 A.2d 1155 (1981) (custody
of thirteen year old granted to maternal grandparents).
74. 285 Pa. Super. at 99, 426 A.2d at 1160.
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of Pennsylvania, in Commonwealth ex rel. Holschuh v. Holland-
Moritz, 75 ruled that custody of two sons would be awarded to the
mother over the maternal grandparents who had cared for the boys
while the mother finished college.76 The court noted that the grand-
parents had failed to produce any evidence indicating the mother
was unfit.
77
The superior court faced an unusual situation in In Interest of
Tremayne Quame Idress R., 7 where it had to determine who carried
the burdens of production and persuasion when the dispute for
custody involved the foster mother and the maternal grandmother-
both third parties.7 9 Relying on In re Hernandez,80 the court refused
to differentiate between third party relatives and third party nonre-
latives, thus giving neither party an "evidentiary leg up" over the
other.8' The court determined that the best interests of the child were
served by awarding custody to the foster mother since the child had
lived with her family a number of years and, had, therefore, developed
strong attachments to the foster family.82 The court explained its
refusal to make distinctions as follows:
To give a relative who is not a parent a possibly decisive procedural
advantage, simply because of being a relative, would in no way serve
to support the traditional family, which in the sort of cases we are
considering no longer exists, and might very well interfere with the
determination of what is in the child's best interest .... [W]here the
custody dispute is between two third parties, one who is a relative but
not a parent, and one who is not a relative, the burden of proof
should be allocated equally between the parties.83
However, the fact that one of the parties to a dispute is a relative
of the child is a factor to be considered by the judge when making
the decision of what is in the child's best interest. 84
75. 448 Pa. 437, 292 A.2d 380 (1972).
76. 448 Pa. at 447, 292 A.2d at 384. [Author's note: The court did not refer
to the right as a presumption, yet the tenor of the opinion indicated it as such.]
77. 448 Pa. at 445, 282 A.2d at 384.
78. 286 Pa. Super. 480, 429 A.2d 40 (1981).
79. 286 Pa. Super. at 485, 429 A.2d at 43.
80. 249 Pa. Super. 274, 376 A.2d 648 (1977). See note 66 supra for a fuller
discussion of the Hernandez decision.
81. In re Tremayne, 286 Pa. Super. at 497-98, 429 A.2d at 49.
82. 286 Pa. Super. at 496-98, 429 A.2d at 49.
83. 286 Pa. Super. at 487, 429 A.2d at 44.
84. Id.
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III. VISITATION.
Pennsylvania courts recognize the importance of protecting the
visitation rights of the non-custodial parent. 85 There exists a danger
that the custodial parent will use his or her position to alienate the
other parent from the child's affections. 6 Therefore, visitation has
generally been limited or denied only in the instances where evidence
indicates the parent suffers from severe moral turpitude or mental
deficiencies which constitute a great threat to the child.87 Even if the
child refuses to visit the noncustodial parent, the courts have the
authority to compel the custodial parent to comply. 88 Thus, it is clear
there exists a strong public policy against limiting the relationship
between parent and child.89 Similarly, the court in Tremayne did not
neglect the family relationship between Tremayne and his maternal
grandmother. On the contrary, the court remanded to the trial judge
with instructions to provide for extended visitation rights, 9° noting
that only in unusual circumstances should a child be entirely cut off
from one side of the family.9'
In a proceeding regarding visitation rights, the primary concern is
the best interest and welfare of the child involved.92 At the custodial
parent's request reasonable conditions can be placed on a parent's
visitation rights. 93 The test of the reasonableness of the conditions is
to see how much they limit the right, i.e., whether it is tantamount
to denying the right. 94 Also, the reviewing courts must determine
85. Hoffer v. Hoffer, 301 Pa. Super. 289, 447 A.2d 972 (1982) (custody
order granting substantial visitation to noncustodial parent was not an abuse of
discretion).
86. Commonwealth ex rel. Lotz v. Lotz, 188 Pa. Super. 241, 146 A.2d 362
(1958), aff'd, 396 Pa. 287, 152 A.2d 663 (1959) (court had authority to compel
mother to have child visit father even if child did not desire to do so).
87. Hughes v. Hughes, 316 Pa. Super. 505, 463 A.2d 478 (1983) (visitation
denied to imprisoned father who had shot and wounded mother while child watched).
88. Stoyko v. Stoyko, 267 Pa. Super. 24, 405 A.2d 1284 (1979) (refusal of
child to see parent should not be allowed to destroy parent's right unless a good
reason can be shown for the child's attitude). See also Nancy E.M. v. Kenneth
D.M., 316 Pa. Super. 351, 462 A.2d 1386 (1983) (fact that child does not wish to
see parent is not sufficient reason to deny visitation).
89. Spells v. Spells, 250 Pa. Super. 168, 175, 378 A.2d 879, 883 (1977).
90. 286 Pa. Super. at 502, 429 A.2d at 52.
91. 286 Pa. Super. at 501, 429 A.2d at 50 (citing Commonwealth ex rel.
Williams v. Miller, 254 Pa. Super. 227, 232, 385 A.2d 992, 995 (1978)).
92. Somers v. Somers, 326 Pa. Super. 556, 474 A.2d 630 (1984) (overly broad
conditions to visitation are unreasonable).
93. Somers, 326 Pa. Super. at 558, 474 A.2d at 631.
94. Nancy E.M., 316 Pa. Super. at 357, 462 A.2d at 1389.
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whether the limitation is reasonable in light of what is best for the
welfare of the child. 9 Visitation rights of adoptive parents are
accorded the same regard as those of natural parents, hence, they
are denied visitation only on a showing of moral turpitude or other
extreme grounds which indicate it is not in the best interest of the
child to allow visitation.96 The best interest of the child is also the
governing criterion in awarding visitation privileges to the putative
father of an illegitimate child. 97 Though it may be that in some
circumstances an allowance of visitation may be detrimental to the
child, such as where it would tend to remind him of his illegitimacy,
if the father is able and willing to contribute to the child's devel-
opment, he should not be barred from doing S0.98
In the above situations, the party requesting visitation with the
child has the privilege almost' as a matter of right, whether the parent
is adoptive, natural or putative. However, when a third party seeks
visitation, whether or not related to the child, the petitioning party
"must show reasons to overcome the parent's prima facie right to
uninterrupted custody." 99 The reasons need not be as convincing as
a request for custody, but need only show the court that "it is in
the child's best interest to give some time to the third party."I °°
The "Custody and Grandparents Visitation Act"10' 1 permits rea-
sonable visitation rights to be given to grandparents where the
95. Somers, 326 Pa. Super. at 559, 474 A.2d at 631.
96. Annot., Visitation-Other Than Natural Parent, 1 ALR 4th 1270, 1272
(1980). See Nancy E.M., 316 Pa. Super. at 353, 462 A.2d at 1387 note 1, wherein
the court explained that it treated the adoptive father as though he was the biological
father of the child whose visitation order was in dispute.
97. Commonwealth v. Rozanski, 206 Pa. Super. 397, 213 A.2d 155 (1965)
rejecting Commonwealth ex rel. Golembewski v. Stanley, 205 Pa. Super. 101, 208
A.2d 49 (1965).
98. Rozanski, 206 Pa. Super. at 400-402, 213 A.2d at 157-58.
99. Commonwealth ex rel. Williams v. Miller, 254 Pa. Super. 227, 230, 385
A.2d 992, 994 (1978).
100. Id. (Emphasis in original). Judge Spaeth suggests a sliding scale approach:
"As the amount of time requested moves the visit further from a visit and closer
to custody, the reasons offered in support of the request must become correspond-
ingly more convincing." 254 Pa. Super. at 230, 385 A.2d at 994.
This language was adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Common-
wealth ex rel. Zaffarano v. Genaro, 500 Pa. 256, 455 A.2d 1180 (1983) (not in
child's best interest to visit with maternal grandparents who have animosity toward
child's father).
101. Act of October 30, 1985, P.L. 264, No. 66, § 1; 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5311 (Supp. Purdon 1987) states:
If a parent of an unmarried child is deceased, the parents or grandparents of
the deceased parent may be granted reasonable custody or visitation rights,
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visitation will be in the best interest of the child and where it will
not interfere with the remaining parent's relationship with the child.102
However, the Act only applies "(1) when a parent is deceased; (2)
when the parents' marriage is dissolved; and (3) when the child has
resided with the grandparents for period of 12 months or more." 103
Thus, if the parent of the child with whom visitation is sought is
neither deceased nor divorced, nor has the child resided with the
grandparents for over a year, there exists no cause of action for
visitation. 0 4 The courts have so interpreted the statute to avoid being
brought into a dispute between grandparents and natural parents,
both of whom are living and whose marriage has not been dis-
solved.'0 5 "Nothing in the case or statutory law legitimizes such an
intrusion by the courts into family life."'' 0
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth ex rel. Zaf-
farano v. Genaro°7 noted the grandparents' right to visitation or
partial custody must yield to what is in the best interest of the
child. 108 Thus, if hostilities exist between the parties which outweigh
or both, to the unmarried child by the court upon a finding that partial
custody or visitation rights, or both, would be in the best interest of the child
and would not interfere with the parent-child relationship. The court shall
consider the amount of personal contact between the parents or grandparents
of the deceased parent and the child prior to the application.
Id. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5312 provides:
In all proceedings for dissolution, subsequent to the commencement of the
proceeding and continuing thereafter or when parents have been separated for
six months or more, the court may, upon application of the parent or
grandparent of a party, grant reasonable partial custody or visitation rights,
or both, to the unmarried child if it finds that visitation rights or partial
custody, or both, would be in the best interest of the child and would not
interfere with the parent-child relationship....
Id. 23 PA. CONS STAT. ANN. § 5313 states:
If an unmarried child has resided with his grandparents or great-grandparents
for a period of 12 months or more and is subsequently removed from the
home by his parents, the grandparents or great-grandparents may petition the
court for an order granting them reasonable partial custody or visitation rights,
or both, to the child. The court shall grant the petition if it finds that visitation
rights would be in the best interest of the child and would not interfere with
the parent-child relationship. Id.
102. Commonwealth ex rel. Shee v. Holewski, 316 Pa. Super. 509, 515, 463
A.2d 480, 483 (1983). See also note 109 and accompanying text.
103. Herron v. Seizak, 321 Pa. Super. 466, 469, 468 A.2d 803, 805 (1983).
104. Herron, 321 Pa. Super. at 469, 468 A.2d at 805.
105. 321 Pa. Super. at 470, 468 A.2d at 805.
106. Id.
107. 500 Pa. 256, 455 A.2d 1180 (1983).
108. 500 Pa. at 264, 455 A.2d at 1184.
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the benefits from a relationship with the grandparents, the courts
will not place the child in a "crossfire" between parents and grand-
parents. ,9
No statutory provision exists in Pennsylvania which provides non-
relative third parties with visitation or partial custody rights. Con-
sequently, a nonrelative third party must show the court it is in the
child's best interest to allow for visitation. n° "This test should not
be understood as inviting visitation suits by well-meaning strangers.""'
In fact, it is highly unlikely, except in the most unusual circumstances,
that a stranger will be able to offer convincing reasons. 112 Nonrelative
third parties who do succeed in convincing the court to permit.
visitation are generally individuals who have had a special relationship
with the child. For example, in Gribble v. Gribble 3 the Utah
Supreme Court noted that a stepfather who had stood in loco parentis
to a child was entitled to a hearing on the matter of visitation. The
court recognized that the stepfather's desire to stand in the place of
a natural parent with regard to obligations should therefore entitle
him to the same visitation rights as a natural parent." 4 In reaching
the decision the Utah court quoted from Spells v. Spells:115 "Rejection
of visitation privileges cannot be grounded in the mere status as a
stepparent."116
Thus, Pennsylvania courts will recognize that an individual may
place himself in loco parentis by assuming obligations incident to
parenthood without going through the formalities of legal adoption. 117
In view of the fact it can be expected that bonds of affection will
be created, the relationship should be protected on the dissolution
109. Id. See also Commonwealth ex rel. Shee v. Holewski, 316 Pa. Super.
509, 463 A.2d 480 (1983) (grandmother refused to accept fact that her daughter was
dead and adoptive mother was grandson's new mother).
110. Miller, 254 Pa. Super. at 230, 385 A.2d at 994.
111. 254 Pa. Super. at 231, 385 A.2d at 994.
112. Id.
113. 583 P.2d 64, 1 ALR 4th 1263 (Utah 1978). The court further noted:
"The common law concerning termination of the loco parentis status is that only
the surrogate parent or child is able to terminate the status at will, and the rights,
duties, and obligations continue as long as they choose to continue the relationship."
583 P.2d at 67.
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-3-5 (1953) provides in pertinent part: "Visitation rights
of parents, grandparents and other relatives shall take into consideration the welfare
of the child." (Emphasis added.)
114. 583 P.2d at 68.
115. 250 Pa. Super. 168, 378 A.2d 879 (1977).
116. 583 P.2d at 68 (citing Spells, 250 Pa. Super at 172, 378 A.2d at 881).
117. Spells, 250 Pa. Super. at 172, 378 A.2d at 881.
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of marriage as would a natural parent-child relationship."1 8 Bearing
in mind the paramount concern is the best interest of the child,
courts must nonetheless permit one in loco parentis to establish his
relationship and to demonstrate that his interest in visiting the child
should be protected." 9
IV. CONCLUSION: JOINT CUSTODY-AN ALTERNATIVE
Sole custody awards relegate the noncustodial parent to the role
of weekend or holiday parent, a mere visitor.1 20 "[E]ven young
children are sufficiently perceptive to begin to sense the lesser status
of the noncustodial parent. This perception, in turn, detracts from
the parent-child relationship. 12' Furthermore, sole custody acts as a
signal to the child that one parent was right and one was wrong.'2
Thus, the notion of sole custody and visitation results in "fathers
and children being arbitrarily denied natural rights and needs."''
From another perspective, sole custody places a severe burden on
the custodial parent who must juggle child rearing and career, yet
still cultivate a social life.'24 It would appear "that the best interests
of the child are disserved by many aspects of sole custody.' '1
25
Pennsylvania courts recognize three types of custodial arrange-
ments: "custody", "partial custody", and "visitation". 26 Under 23
118. 250 Pa. Super. at 172, 378 A.2d at 882.
119. 250 Pa. Super. at 175, 378 A.2d at 883.
120. Note, Joint Custody Awards: Toward the Development of Judicial Stand-
ards, 48 Fordham L. Rev. 105, 111 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Joint Custody
A wards.]
121. Grace v. Wood, 39 Pa. D.&C. 3d 72 (1982) (award of joint custody
proper when both parents fit, children desire the arrangement, and minimal disrup-
tion will occur).
122. Miller, Joint Custody, 13 Fam. L. Q. 345, 355 (1979). [hereinafter cited as
Miller.]
123. Id. at 356. Miller, supra notes that the mother receives sole custody in
an "overwhelming majority" of cases, at 355 note 58. See also Joint Custody
Awards, supra note 120, at 106 note 5 (94,5% of the children under 18 of divorce
or separation live with the mother).
124. Miller, supra note 122 at 356.
125. Grace v. Wood, 39 Pa. D.&C.3d at 79 (citing Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J.
480, 432 A.2d 63, 65 (1981)).
126. Commonwealth ex rel. Zaffarano v. Genaro, 500 Pa. 256, 259, 455 A.2d
1180, 1182 note 5 (1983). "Partial custody" or "divided custody" results in the
parties having the child for a segment of time yet having full legal responsibility
and control during the time period.
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PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5304127 the legislature has provided for the
award of shared custody. Shared custody, or joint custody, offers
an arrangement where both parents share equally in the decision-
making and responsibilities of child rearing while enjoying equal and
alternating companionship with the child.' 28 Such an arrangement
may be beneficial to the child whose perception of the divorce and
the departure of one parent is akin to grief over a deceased parent.
129
Joint custody can provide for the continuation of the relationships
between the child and both parents, thereby reducing the possible
deterioration of the relationships which often result from the more
common sole custody/visitation situation.1
30
Admittedly, it is not easy, several obstacles must be overcome to
make joint or shared custody work. One major concern centers
around whether the difficulties which lead to the dissolution of the
marriage will resurface.1 31 Another important criticism addresses the
potential for instability joint or shared custody causes in the minor
child's life. 32 The parents' differing lifestyles and standards create
additional confusion. 3  Also, the child may attempt to manipulate
the parents by setting one against the other.13 4 These obstacles can
only be overcome if the parents are willing to set aside their marital
differences and reach mutual decisions concerning the child.
3 5
Courts contemplating a joint custody award must consider three
conditions or factors.1 36 First, each parent's custodial fitness must be
evaluated.137 Second, the parents must express a willingness to co-
operate in the joint award. 38 And, finally, the court must find a
127. Act of October 30, 1985, P.L. 264, No. 66, § 1, 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5304 (Supp. Purdon 1987) states:
An order for shared custody may be awarded by the court when it is in the
best interest of the child:
(1) upon application by one or both parents;
(2) when the parties have agreed to an award of shared custody; or
(3) in the discretion of the court.
128. Grace v. Wood, 39 Pa. D.&C. 3d at 80.
129. Joint Custody Awards, supra note 120, at 112-13 note 34.
130. Grace v. Wood, 39 Pa. D.&C. 3d at 80-81.
131. Joint Custody Awards, supra note 120, at 115.
132. Id. See also Miller, supra note 122, at 366-67.
133. Miller, supra note 122, at 367.
134. Id. at 367-68.
135. Joint Custody Awards, supra note 120, at 118.
136. Id. at 119. See also Miller, supra note 122, at 369.
137. Joint Custody Awards, supra note 120, at 119. See also Miller, supra
note 122, at 369.
138. See supra note 137.
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joint award not only workable between the parents, but also in the
best interest of the child.1
39
Workability of joint custody may not only depend on the spirit of
cooperation; geographic locations may also act as a stumbling block.
In Miller v. Miller 4 0 the trial judge noted that the case would have
been an excellent instance for joint custody if both parties had
resided in the same school district 4' since both parents were equally
fit. An interesting solution to alternating physical custody of the
children was used in Schilleman v. Schilleman142 where the children
remained in the marital home and the parents alternated residence
at six month intervals.
A threshold question to joint custody was raised by the court in
Grace v. Wood:'4 has the child established such relationships with
both parents that he would benefit from joint custody. 144 In the
instant case the court noted the condition was met, but the inference
is that a finding to the contrary could result in an award of sole
custody to one parent.
In view of the standard in Pennsylvania, that custody and visitation
will be awarded where it is in the best interest and welfare of the
child, there is a considerable amount of flexibility and discretion
lodged in the courts determining these very sensitive issues. Obviously,
the courts recognize that not all parents of divorce can share in joint
custody of their children. However, the fact that joint custody
represents an unusual or different approach, should not discredit it
as a viable alternative. For even unlimited visitation cannot give a
child the contact with the noncustodial parent which he needs and
to which he has a right. 145
139. Joint Custody Awards, supra note 120, at 119. It is further recommended
that parents share similar values in areas such as child rearing. Miller, supra note
122, at 370.
140. 327 Pa. Super. 45, 474 A.2d 1165 (1984).
141. 327 Pa. Super. at 48, 474 A.2d at 1166.
142. 61 Mich. App. 446, 232 N.W.2d 737 (1975).
143. 39 Pa. D.&C. 3d 72 (1982).
144. Id. at 79 note 4 citing Mastropole v. Mastropole, 87 Fam. L. Rev. 1025,
2091 (November 10, 1981).
145. 39 Pa. D.&C. 3d at 81 (citing Mayer v. Mayer, 150 N.J. Super. 556, 376
A.2d 214, 220 (1977)).

